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Social aspects of Total's Lacq CCS pilot project  
 
Abstract 
This case study describes the social aspects of Total's CO2 integrated capture, transport and storage 
pilot project in Frontsouthwestern France, from the initial press conference February 8th, 2007 to the 
announce of its end in 2013. The economic and social context was favorable. The company 
proactively conducted an outreach campaign relatively large for a 50 m€ investment. It was followed 
by an effective involvement of stakeholders, if not of the general public, through a formal continuous 
deliberation process led by the public authorities. Some neighbors used their rights to protest and 
challenge legally the project. It did not become an issue at the national level. 
 
Keywords : CCS, pilot project, outreach, communication, France, case study. 
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Aspects sociaux du projet pilote de CSC réalisé par Total à Lacq  
 
Résumé 
Cette étude de cas décrit les aspects sociaux du projet pilote intégré de captage, transport, stockage 
du CO2, réalisé par Total dans le Sud-Ouest de la France, de la première conférence de presse le 8 
février 2007 à l'annonce de la fin d'injection en 2013. Le contexte économique et social était favorable. 
L'entreprise a conduit une campagne de sensibilisation proactive relativement importante pour un 
investissement de 50 m €. Cette campagne a été suivie par une implication effective des parties 
prenantes, sinon du grand public, à travers un processus de délibération formelle continue menée par 
les pouvoirs publics. Certains voisins ont manifesté contre et contesté juridiquement le projet, sans 
parvenir à l'arrêter ni à en faire un problème de niveau national. 
 
Mots-clés: CSC, projet pilote, sensibilisation, communication, France, étude de cas. 
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Abstract:  This case study describes the social aspects of Total's CO2 integrated capture, transport 
and storage pilot project in Frontsouthwestern France, from the initial press conference February 
8th, 2007 to the announce of its end in 2013. The economic and social context was favorable. The 
company proactively conducted an outreach campaign relatively large for a 50 m€ investment. It 
was followed by an effective involvement of stakeholders, if not of the general public, through a 
formal continuous deliberation process led by the public authorities. Some neighbors used their 
rights to protest and challenge legally the project. It did not become an issue at the national level.
Keywords: CCS; pilot project; outreach; communication; France, case study
Résumé: Cette étude de cas décrit les aspects sociaux du projet pilote intégré de captage, transport,  
stockage du CO2, réalisé par Total dans le Sud-Ouest de la France, de la première conférence de 
presse le 8 février 2007 à l'annonce de la fin d'injection en 2013. Le contexte économique et social 
était  favorable.  L'entreprise  a  conduit  une  campagne  de  sensibilisation  proactive  relativement 
importante pour un investissement de 50 m €. Cette campagne a été suivie par une implication 
effective  des  parties  prenantes,  sinon  du  grand  public,  à  travers  un  processus  de  délibération 
formelle continue menée par les pouvoirs publics. Certains voisins ont manifesté contre et contesté 
juridiquement le projet, sans parvenir à l'arrêter ni à en faire un problème de niveau national.
1. Introduction
Total's CO2 capture, transport and storage (CCS) research pilot project in Lacq  –inaugurated in 
2010– was not only a technical  experiment,  but also a social  and legal  innovation.  Apart  from 
enhanced oil recovery projects or projects where the captured CO2 is a fatal byproduct of another 
industrial process, this was one of the first integrated CCS projects in the world at this scale, and the 
first to be authorized in France. During the two years of the experiment, about 30 000 metric tons of 
CO2 per  year  were  captured  from  a  steam  production  unit  retrofitted  with  oxycombustion  in 
collaboration with Air Liquide. The captured gas was compressed to 27 bars and transported for 
about 30 km reusing an existing natural gas pipeline. The gas was then injected at about 50 bars  
through a reworked existing well into the depleted natural gas field of Rousse 1 rock formation 
4 500  meters  underground.  Injected  CO2 quantities  are  low  compared  to  initial  natural  gas 
quantities:  The  reservoir  pressure,  currently  30  bars,  should  be  increased  to  50-70  bars  post 
injection, which remains well below the initial pressure of 480 bars.
* Corresponding author. Tel. +33-143-94-7381. Email < haduong@cired.fr. >
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The  project  was  conducted  at  Total's  Lacq  plant,  in  southwestern  France.  It  included  a 
comprehensive  monitoring  network.  And  in  addition  to  the  research  based  on  science  and 
engineering, it contributed to advances on the legal and social aspects of CCS in France and in 
Europe. The social aspect's significance arise from the relatively high stakes: a large population 
lives close to the storage area, in the city of Pau, 85 000 inhabitants in 2007. In the immediate 
surroundings of the storage area, the population is semi-urban or rural with low history of industry. 
After describing the context, this text will introduce the national and local actors. The project's story 
will be told in three parts: before and after the official permit request, and operations. The final 
sections will analyze broader impact as seen through the press coverage, summarize the lessons 
learned and conclude. Interactive versions of the timeline (Illustration 3) and the map (Illustration
6) are published as additional online material1.
2. Local history
Total's integrated CCS pilot project takes place in a valley along the  Gave de Pau river, in the 
Béarn cultural area, in the Pyrénées Atlantiques (64) department of France, see Illustration 6. The 
Lacq natural gas field was discovered accidentally at -3 550 m while digging for oil in 1951. It has 
been an important national asset for France, providing up to one third of the domestic natural gas 
consumption. Production peaked in 1982 at 33 million m³/day. But the flow has declined to under 
1 Additional electronic material is located at http://minh.haduong.com/Lacq_CCS_Pilot/.
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Illustration 1: Aerial view of the Lacq natural gas processing plant. Empty lots show the decline in 
industrial activity. Industrial risk and harmful effects do not prevent people from living close to the 
site (red dot). Image (c) Geoportail.
10 million m³/day by 2009, and the end of the field's economic life is announced for 2013. As 
Illustration 1 shows, there are now many empty lots in Lacq's processing plant. After 50 years of 
natural  gas  bonanza,  economic  development  plans  for  the  valley are  being  reinvented.  Several 
specialty chemicals production facilities, a bioethanol plant, a carbon fiber plant and a combined 
cycle  power  plant  have  been  attracted  or  are  under  consideration.  In  this  context  where  the 
economic future of the area is at stake, Total's announcement of the carbon capture and storage 
project had a clear value to the community.  The project fits with the firm's broader strategy to 
manage responsibly the plant shutdown, not only by supporting local small and medium enterprises 
through its subsidiary Total Développement Régional (Total DDR) but also by directly investing in 
training and R&D activities on the platform.
Lacq's natural gas is very dangerous, because it contains 16% H2S and 10% CO2. The gas is so 
corrosive that when the plant opened in 1957, special steels had to be developed (Lerat 1957). Yet 
the processing plant's safety record shows no fatal accident outside it, even though some inhabitants 
live very close as  Illustration 1 shows. The risk is not only present near the plant. The gas field 
extends dozens of kilometers beyond Lacq, reaching under the city of Pau. Consequently there is a 
wide network of collection pipelines in the area. These may have a low impact for newly installed  
inhabitants, especially since some of them are no longer in operation, like in Rousse. But local 
citizens can have a memory or direct knowledge of the visual, air and noise pollutions that come 
from living in a valley rich in heavy industries  (Briand 2006). Local institutions have experience 
with managing dangerous gases and pipelines risks.
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Illustration 2: Aerial view of the Rousse 1 CO2 injection site in 2009, busy with equipments revising  
the well before injection (arrow). Surrounding landscape is hills covered with low density 
residential lots, wineyards, fields and patches of wood. In the background the cities of Jurançon 
and Pau are at approximately 5 km. Image (c) Total, used with permission.
According to (Grimot et al. 2002), since the beginning of oil and gas production in the area, various 
liquid streams have been re-injected in the geologic structures. Some of these liquids came from the 
underground fields themselves, some came from the processing plant. Injection of liquid waste from 
other chemical plants in the industrial park is presently authorized in the geologic formation known 
as  "Crétacé 4000".  Injection  rate  were  maximal  in  1978-1979 at  about  1 000 m3/day,  at  a  cost 
around 10 €/t. This is an economic opportunity, as some chemical waste streams would require up 
to 600 €/t to process otherwise. According to (CCI Pau Béarn, Service Etudes & Aménagement du 
Territoire 2004) that opportunity is a significant asset for the region, as only 2% of the disposal 
capacity  has  been  used  up  in  40  years.  Following  a  recommendation  by  the  French  national 
commission on public  debates  (CNDP),  in  2001-2002 a  concertation  took place  on whether  to 
renew the Cretacé 4000 permit (Maginot 2005), (Metras 2001). Even if all this was not tied to the 
CCS project technically, legally or administratively, it contributed to the local political culture of 
concertation about industrial risk and geological injection.
3. National actors
The Lacq CCS research pilot has attracted the attention of a number of different social groups. Each 
had its own representation of the technology, its benefits and the risks associated. The next section 
will describe these groups at the local level, this section describes the groups at the national level.
In  2008  the  governmental  view  on  CCS  was  supportive.  France  participated  in  international 
workgroups  declaring  that  the  development  of  this  technology  was  an  important  option  fore 
mitigation  (Commission Of The European Communities 2008) (G8 2008). At the national level, 
three public institutions have a special interest on CCS:
• Bureau  des  Recherches  Géologiques  et  Minières  (BRGM),  France's  leading  public 
institution in Earth science applications.
• IFP Energies  nouvelles  (IFPEn),  a  public  research,  innovation  and  training  institution, 
whose  mission  is  to  develop  efficient  technologies,  economic,  clean  and  sustainable  in 
energy, transport and environment.
• Agence de l'Environnement et de la Maîtrise de l'Energie (ADEME), the public agency on 
environment, energy and sustainable development. ADEME is under the control of three 
ministries: Ecology, sustainable development transport and housing (MEEDDAT); Higher 
education and research; Economy, finance and industry.
In 2002, these three public institutions created together the Club CO2, to improve the coordination 
of  French research in the field of carbon capture and storage. According to its chairman (Moisan 
2011) "The members of the Club, which is chaired by ADEME, are all key players in industry,  
research and development. As a clearinghouse for information, dialogue and good practices among 
its  members  in  the  area  of  research  and  technological  developments  concerning  CO2 capture, 
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Illustration 3: Timeline of the Lacq pilot CCS project's concertation context. Events in the top part 
of the timeline are directly related to the project, while events in the lower part relate to the broader  
context of CCS in France. An deeper interactive timeline is at 
http://minh.haduong.com/Lacq_CCS_Pilot/timeline/.
transport and storage, the Club encourages cooperation at national level between the public and 
private sectors, and several research projects have been started under its initiative."
Large, national-scale environmental non-governmental organisations (ENGO) were not members of 
the Club CO2, as Tableau 1 shows. While by 2007, the ENGOs did not have a public position for or 
against carbon capture and storage, the following year Greenpeace demonstrated a disapprobative 
viewpoint in the "False Hope" report (Rochon & others 2008). That report's ideas were injected in 
the  public  debate  around  the  Lacq  CCS  project  by  an  article  in  a  popular  science  magazine 
published in March 2009 (Gaullier 2009). Other ENGOs were less strongly negative. France Nature 
Environnement (FNE) was called in 2007 by local ENGOs around Lacq to take a position on CCS 
(Pépin 2009). The association questionned the long-term reliability and local risks of CSC; and 
stressed  that  the  large  financial  flows  for  its  development  could  be  used  for  renewables,  but 
suggested that in principle CCS could be admitted when other solutions are not available (Delacroix 
2008). The Réseau Action Climat France (RAC-F), a coordination of leading ENGOs concerned 
about climate change, noted that the technology could reduce CO2 emissions, but will be efficient 
only if  it  belongs  to  a  set  of  measures  based  on legally  binding and ambitious  commitments, 
concluding that "CCS should not be an excuse to slow energy efficiency improvement actions and 
the development of renewable energy sources" (Moussally 2010).
A scientific follow-up comitee was created, to allow for the dissemination of the project's results 
outside Total and Air Liquide. This "open for outside research" policy was effective, more than a 
dozen research projects were conducted on site, many involving international partners. The French 
academic community was particularly mobilized by the project. Scientists participated in public 
discussion panels at townhalls meetings during the project's concertation phase. Several research 
seminars and open workshops were organized in Pau (December 12-13th 2007, September 4th, 
2009; November 22-23rd, 2010). These manifestations were opportunities to disseminate up to date 
knowledge about CCS to local actors.
4. Local actors
When the project was started, Total was the fifth largest publicly-traded integrated international oil 
and gas company. It operated in more than 130 countries and had 96 950 employees (Total 2009). 
According  to  Chempark (2006),  861  persons  were  directly  working  for  Total  Exploration 
Production France in Lacq. In addition, the main research center of Total dedicated to oil and gas 
exploration (Centre Scientifique Jean Feger) was located in Pau, with more than 2 000 employees 
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Public agency or public 
research institution
7 ADEME, BRGM, CNRS (INSU), Ecole des Mines de Paris, IFPEn, 
INERIS, IPGP (Institut de Physique du Globe de Paris)
Local business 
development organisation
3 Avenia, Grand Port Maritime de Marseille, Pôle Risques
Businesses
(> 10.000 workers)
15 Air  Liquide,  Alstom,  ArcelorMittal,  Bureau  Veritas,  EDF,GDF 
SUEZ,  Lafarge,  Rhodia,  SARP Industries (Veolia  group),  Saipem 
(group ENI),  Schlumberger, SNET (E.ON France group),  Technip, 
Total et Veolia Environnement.
Businesses
(< 10.000 workers)
6 Geogreen,  Oxand,  SARP Industries,  Setaram Instrumentation (KEP 
Technologies group), Sofregaz (Maire Tecnimont group), Soufflet
Tableau 1 : Club CO2 membership, September 2011.
(Total  and  subcontractors)  working  in  this  research  center.  Total  is  widely  established  in  the 
Pyrénées-Atlantiques territory, and beyond its own employees it supports a network of economic 
actors. The balance of local economic and political power clearly tilted towards the largest French 
multinational.
Locally, the Direction Régionale de la Recherche de l’Industrie et de l’Environnement in Aquitaine 
(DRIRE)2 administration  represents  the  interest  of  the  State.  DRIRE  has  the  responsibility  to 
investigate the injection authorization request and prepare the decision by the Prefect, accounting 
for the national public good as well as the local communities and businesses. The DRIRE's key role 
in organizing the public dialogue will be discussed further in section 7.
The civil society directly engaged in or impacted by Lacq's CCS project involves neighbors, local 
communities and their elected representatives. The project spreads on 11 cities (see Illustration 6). 
This makes for a diverse panel of stakeholders and local interests, which can be summarized in 
three classes of communities:
• Communities close to the capture site benefit from industrial jobs at the Lacq plant. Their 
economic  life  directly  benefits  from  the  natural  gas  field,  and  what  to  do  when  it  is  
exhausted is a critical question for them. The direct implication of Total in the local society, 
education, associations is also a source of positive company reputation. As a measure of the 
corporate solidarity demonstrated by Total, Arquizan (2008) writes that over 30 years, Total 
DDR lend 140 million euros to 500 starting companies in the department.
• The picture is different the other end of the pipeline. The population of wine growers and 
farmers is less affected by the employment situation in the Lacq industrial area. They belong 
to  a  territory  of  about  10  km²  (1000  ha)  officially  recognized  as  producing  "Vin  du 
Jurançon",  an  Appelation  d'Origine  Controlée  (AOC) quality  label  wine.  This  is  an  old 
tradition, as the first recorded sale of Jurançon wine at the abbey of Saint Vincent dates back 
to year 988 CE. Through the century Jurançon white wines have undergone ups and downs. 
Jurançon's royal fame goes back to 1553, when infant Henry IV’s lips were rubbed with 
garlic and wet with wine from the local region at his baptism.
• Patches of the Jurançon territory have started to become residential neighborhoods for the 
larger Pau city.
The position of elected representatives reflects this variety of interests. Mayors in the Lacq basin 
publicly took position for the project from the start, and made it known to other players at the first 
CLIS meeting held on June 3, 2008. Mayors from the Jurançon hillsides did not take side during the 
project's concertation, which occured during the campaign period for municipal elections. After the 
March 2008 elections, the new Mayor took a stance by questioning Total's responsibility after its 
departure  from the  site.  This  would  remain  his  main  negociating  position.  The strength  of  the 
question was backed by the Mayor's position as a professional judge in Toulouse's administrative 
court, and its seriousness was recognized by the project's management.
Given the industrial history of the region, there are existing environmental NGOs watching over 
new industrial developments. At the start of the project, they had no defined position on CCS. Two 
existing  associations  jointly  articulated  an  explicit  argumentation  opposing  the  project :  Santé-
Environnement-Bassin de Lacq and SEPANSO Bearn. In addition to the arguments against CCS as 
a technology expressed by FNE, they argued that the project was mostly useless, expensive and 
risky for neighbors considering the population density and seismic activity (Mauhourat & Lambert-
Habib 2008). In addition, a specific association named Coteaux de Jurancon Environnement (CJE) 
was created by the citizens concerned by the injection project, in order to get informed and mobilize 
2 This branch of the administration was renamed in January 2011 the Direction Régionale de l’Environnement et de 
l’Aménagement et du Logement (DREAL).
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themselves. CJE and Sepanso actively participated in the official public discussions at a level where 
isolated citizens could not have attended directly.
To structure the list of actors, we organized a stakeholders analysis around the Lacq CCS project, 
independently from the consulting company hired by Total. Our study was based on face to face 
interviews in the field conducted in the first semester of 2007, participation at discussion workshops 
and a bibliographic survey  (Pfeifle & A. S. Campos 2008). This describes the situation around 
September 2008, at the end of the public enquiry phase.
Based on that work, Table 2 locates the various stakeholders in the Influence / Support plane. The 
key players are those with both a high influence and a high degree of support for the project. They 
are located towards the upper right of the matrix. They appear to be the industry actors, institutions 
and experts. They are allied for the development of the field of CCS in France, and expect that the 
success of the pilot Lacq will only reinforce this position. Medias, national ENGOs and most but 
not all town councils had a minor role in the discussions. Ignorance about a new technology could 
explain why these players did not have a clear position and influence for the future of the industry. 
Overall,  the top-left  corner is  empty.  This shows that  no opposition has been influential  in the 
upstream phase of the implementation of pilot. The social context was favorable.
5. Residents of the Jurancon area around the injection site
We send a questionnaire survey to the fraction of the population of the city of Jurancon who lives in 
the area where the CO2 was to be injected. The area is a mix of a rural area with agricultural activity 
(mainly vineyard) and a low density residential area with mainly wealthy families and a significant 
proportion of retired people.
The survey was sent nominatively, with a stamped return envelope. Jurancon city has a population 
of more than 7 000 inhabitants : the survey reached 1 206 mailboxes concentrated in the area of the 
pilot project. That is roughly one third of the mailboxes of the city.
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Highest 
influence
Préfecture des Pyrénées-
Atlantiques
DRIRE Aquitaine
IFP, INERIS, BRGM
European Commission
MEDDAT / DGEMP
Lacq basin industrial 
companies
High 
influence
Coteaux Jurançon 
Environnement
Santé Environnement du 
Bassin de Lacq
Sepanso Béarn / France 
Nature Environnement
Conseil Général des 
Pyrénées-Atlantiques
Pau town council
Communauté des 
communes de Lacq
Low 
influence
Neighbors
National press
Jurançon town council
Laroin town council
Monein town council Mourenx town council
Lowest 
influence
Greenpeace 
international
WWF Université de Pau et des 
Pays de l’Adour
No support Low support High support Highest support
Table 2 : Influence - support mapping of the stakeholders for the Lacq CCS project.
The survey was send  out  in october 2008, after the formal public dialogue  but  before  the 
authorization. At that time, most inhabitants could have been aware of the project either through the 
concertation organized by Total in 2007, or through the public inquiry which took place in the 
summer 2008.
The response ratio to the survey was 14%. Compared to the 8 to 10% response ratio expected for 
this type of survey, this was satisfying: 167 survey came back, 153 being completed, 14 with clear 
indication that they were not willing to respond.  Those 14 correspond probably to the most radical 
part of CJE association, who did not want to participate to a survey which was  seen as a way to  
weaken their position.
Given the population of the area, the proportion of retired people in the respondents was a high 
42%.  The  share  of  respondents  salaried  in  private  companies  was  28%,  salaried in a  public 
organization 12%, independent workers 12%, and unemployed 3%. This response ratio is also good 
considering also the survey's length: 89 questions. We organized them in 5 parts: general questions 
about the context, information about the CCS pilot, the concertation organized by Total, the formal 
dialogue (public enquiry and CLIS), social acceptance.
5.1. Context. The first set of questions was about the general and local context of the CCS pilot. We 
meant to evaluate the sensibility of the respondents to the global environmental and social issues.
To the question "Among the environmental issues, which do you feel to be the more worrisome? 
(two possible answers)",  climate change came first (48%),  before water pollution (29%), air 
pollution (26%), forest destruction (21%), over exploitation of agricultural resources (15%), soil 
contamination (13%), ozone layer reduction (10%), GMO (9%), and noise (5%).
At the next  questions,  82% completely agree or agree with  the idea Humankind is completely 
responsible for the climate change and 91% completely agree or agree that it is urgent to act against 
climate change. When  asked the question of what to do, the respondents massively answer 
renewable energies and reduction of energy consumption. Among the CO2 sequestration techniques, 
the respondents choose the biological solutions first  (storing  carbon  in  forests), before the 
geological storage.
This result may reflect a simplistic vision of a biological solution where the CO2 is "destroyed", as 
opposed to a vision of the geological disposal, where CO2 is only stored with the risk of leakage.
After the series of questions on the global issues, the survey goes into questions on local issues. And 
the answers are significantly different than for global questions. When asked which of the local 
problems is the most worrisome, climate change comes only in seventh position after poverty and 
exclusion, environmental degradation, globalization, unemployment, technological risks  and 
safety/terrorism.
5.2. Information about the CCS pilot. Although information has been spread through newspapers, 
meetings organized by TOTAL, and  the formal public dialogue, there was still 7% of the 
respondents who said they had no information. About  40% indicated that  they became  first 
informed in 2007 (concertation organized by TOTAL), another 9 % at the beginning of 2008, 28% 
in the summer of 2008 (during the public inquiry) and 16% in fall 2008 (at the time of the survey).
When asked about how they were informed about the project, 41% of respondents cited the local 
press and other media. Total's  newsletter sent by mail and the  information  meetings were  the 
information source for 27% of the respondents. The rest got mainly their information by word of 
mouth (24%).  Only 10% of respondents declared to  have accessed Total internet site  or  others 
internet sites. Yet 55% of the respondents declared that the information they have on the pilot is not 
sufficient.
When  asked  to  indicate  the  interesting aspects of the pilot  (several  answers  permitted), the 
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respondents massively cite the scientific interest (65 responses). The economical development (29 
responses), employment (27 responses), industrial attractivity (23 responses) are also cited, but less.
5.3. The concertation organized by TOTAL. 40% of the respondents knew that Total organized 
concertation meetings. This information came to them mainly by the press (57% of respondents). 
Only 13% of the respondents were present at those meetings. Even less (7%) had knowledge of the 
proceedings and outcome of the the meetings.
When asked "which information source can provide you additional information on the project" 
(several answers permitted), Scientists come first (60 answers). National environmental associations 
come second (35). The less often answered information sources were Total, the local politicians and 
the local associations, with about 20 citations each.
5.4. Formal public dialogue (organised by the Prefect). 70% of the respondents said that a public 
inquiry was important to take account of the neighbors' interest in the project. But only 9% said that 
they participated effectively to the public inquiry. 33% of the respondents declared that they have 
heard about  the existence of the Commission locale d’Information et de Suivi (CLIS), and only 
10% had been informed of the results of its first meetings.
5.5. Social acceptance The storage of CO2 is re-using an old gas extraction well. People in 
Jurançon are used to see in the landscape gas wells and gas pipe manifolds which have been 
operating for more than 40 years. When asked if they felt that Total had a good risk management on 
those wells and pipes: 40% responded yes, 18% no, and 40% did not know. 31% declared having 
experienced some nuisance from these installations, while 69% had no nuisance.
We  asked if  there was still a  need to  negotiate on the pilot's  implementation: a majority of 
respondent  (51%) were positive.  A small  minority  (15%) felt there was no need for additional 
negotiation, and one third had no opinion. These answers come after the public consultation.
Asked about who should participate in the negotiations on the pilot's implementation, respondents 
covered a wide  range of stakeholders as follows: Neighbors and their  associations (35%),  local 
elected representatives (25%), environmental associations (22%), local services of the State (13%), 
and other interested industrials (5%).
Finally, we asked under which conditions could the respondent subscribe to the project (several 
answers permitted). Environmental protection guarantees came first (72 answers), along with safety 
guarantees (68 answers) andguarantees on the long term future of the injection site (51 answers). A 
few responses mentioned respect of the cultural heritage (21 answers), jobs creation (20 answers), 
and  financial compensation (15 answers). Five respondents answered that  the existing conditions 
were enough,  as  opposed to  32 who  indicated  that they would not accept the pilot under any 
condition.
Results to the questionnaire confirm the wide mental difference between the local and the general 
scales. Locally, social issues and local environmental issues are felt more important than climate 
change, probably seen as too far from immediate concerns of people.
Results on information shows that it arrives mostly through mass media (the press) and word of 
mouth. There is  a low  proactivity in the search of information. Results  also suggests  that people 
have well  constrasted opinions on  the quality of their  information  sources.  The low use of the 
available information could be due in part to the mistrust in information provided by TOTAL. Our 
results here are similar to those found by (Huijts et al. 2007) and other opinion surveys reviewed by 
(A. sofia Campos et al. 2010).
Having started at the beginning of 2008 before the public inquiry, the CLIS had met several times at 
the time of the opinion survey, its proceedings were available on the web. Answers about the CLIS 
and about the public enquiry corroborate the idea that, except for radical opponents, people have 
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low motivation for direct participation in the formal public dialogue organized by the law. This 
result fits with the general conclusion of (Fourniau 2011) that the French model of public debate is 
waiting for a rebound (Pancher 2011).
Since most people do not engage themselves in the concertation, to them the cost of negotiation is 
very small. This may explain why the demand is so high. Even after the significant diligence of the 
industry and administration, most respondents asked for more discussions regarding environment, 
safety  and  long  term  follow-up.  This  points  at  the  relevance  of  an  enduring  negociation 
commission, the CLIS, as opposed to the one-shot public enquiry.
6. Announcement, social characterization and concertation (2007)
Illustration 3 shows the project's timeline. The final investment decision was taken at the end of 
2006, and the first press release occured on February 8th, 2007 (Total 2007b). The project initially 
aimed to inject up to 150 000 t CO2 starting at the end of 2008. The costs –60 million euros capex, 
plus 10M€ per year opex– are supported privately by Total.  A scientific committee advises the 
project  and  allows  to  maximize  the  research  spillovers  to  the  academic  world.  All  leading 
geological research institutions in France: Institut Français du Pétrole (IFP); Bureau de Recherches 
Géologiques et Minières (BRGM); Institut National de l'Environnement Industriel et des Risques 
(INERIS);  University of  Pau Pays  de l'Adour (UPPA);  Institut  de Physique  du Globe de Paris  
(IPGP) as well as TNO are scientifically collaborating.
Total's outreach activities, comprehensively reported on their website (Total 2008) were voluntary 
and  started  well  in  advance  of  the  administrative  process.  C&S  Conseils,  a  specialized 
communication  consulting  company from Paris,  helped  to  study the  social  context,  define  the 
methods, conduct the concertation and write the associated materials. The initial announcement was 
closely followed by a public information meeting held at Jurançon in March 2007. This was held 
with neighbors of the Rousse future injection site. Globally, there was no negative feelings at this 
meeting. The discussions were rather questions about the possible consequences, noise or visual 
impacts, zoning change and financial compensations for the city.
A social characterization study to organize the concertation was performed next. Between June and 
September 2007, C&S Conseils conducted about forty interviews with local and regional actors: 
elected  representatives  including  all  the  mayors  of  the  cities  crossed  by  the  pipeline, 
administrations, associations, businesses; and with the members of the project's scientific follow-up 
committee. The study led to the concertation itself, that included:
• Commitment to a "Charte de la concertation" (Total 2007a) in which the company states the 
transparency  guidelines  according  to  which  it  promises  to  conduct  the  concertation.  A 
guiding principle was that "All participants to public dialog do not take part in the final 
decision but all participants in the decision making take part in the public dialogue. "
• Publication of a 52 pages brochure (C&S Conseils 2007a) and its 8 pages synthesis  (C&S 
Conseils 2007b) The documents are organized around four topics: climate change; the CCS 
technology; the goals and characteristics of the pilot project; and the impacts and conditions 
of implementation.
• A section of about 10 pages on climate change, CCS and the project on Total.com web, and 
an exhibit on the project displayed at meeting places and at the Pau airport.
• Oral presentations and Questions/Answers sessions at three public meetings organized in the 
town-halls  of  Jurançon,  Pau  and  Mourenx.  A total  audience  of  about  300  participants 
attended the meetings, each about two and a half hours. Talks by Total representatives were 
complemented and discussed by national experts from outside the project.
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Meeting summaries were published on Total's website (Total 2008). Discussions with the public 
about local effects were related to security, land value, image risks for other activities like wine 
growing  and  visual  impact  on  the  site.  Discussions  on  regional  effects  centered  on  economic 
attractivity,  industrial development, jobs and fiscality.  General discussions on CSC examined its 
costs, scale, additional energy needs, regulation, public subsidies, long term responsibility and risk 
control.
According to (Total 2008) the outcome of the concertation was first a clarification the agreements 
and disagreements. All participants agreed that: climate change is an urgent issue; increasing energy 
conservation, efficiency and renewables is more important than CCS; a governance open to civil 
society is a goal to reach; the project contributes to the economic renewal of the area; and security 
and mastering the risks is an absolute priority. There was two points of dissent: the potential of CCS 
against climate change; whether CCS should be regulated under the Mining code or the code of the 
Environment, a point liked with the question of the legal status of CO2 (waste or not).
There was several substantive outcomes of the concertation. First, an information day on climate 
change and its  mitigation was decided, held on October  2nd, 2008 in Pau's  historical congress 
center  (Penot  2008).  Second,  it  was  agreed  to  continue  the  dialogue  by  setting  up  a  local 
commission on information and follow-up (Commission Locale d'Information et de Suivi, CLIS). 
Third, Total promised they "will help local projects related to climate change mitigation (provided 
they are supported by the city)", and that discussions on taxes could be opened. Fourth, after the 
concertation  the  project's  neighbors  formed  an  association:  Coteaux  du  Jurançon  Environment 
(CJE),  officially  registered  on  January  16th,  2008.  Fifth,  the  technical  plan  was  amended  to 
decrease the visual impact and the noise. It was decided to locate the compressor at the injection site 
inside a shelter.
7. Formal dialogue and authorization (2008-2009)
In  France,  large  industrial  projects  have  traditionnally  been  justified  by  public  service  (utilité  
publique) and technical progress. The State had the ultimate authority, caring for the general interest 
in the second half of the twentieth century under the overarching goal of building a modern nation. 
Today, this centralized viewpoint is fading in popularity. Civil society demands more and more to 
be associated in decision-making processes on spatial planning or large industrial projects. This 
opening of the public decision to include more the citizens has been formalized in a stream of legal 
rules  started  in  the  mid-seventies  with  the  environmental  impact  assessment  law  (République 
Française 1976) and reviewed by (Pelchat 2002) in the context of the Aarhus convention.
Total  filed  the  formal  authorization  request  (Demande  D'Autorisation  d'Exploiter)  with  the 
Prefecture  des  Pyrénées  Atlantiques  in  April,  2008.  The  Préfecture  des  Pyrénées-Atlantiques, 
representing locally the French State, was in charge of examining the permit request. This was the 
first CCS project to be processed in France. The central ministry send a framing note to the Prefect  
(circulaire MEDDAAT du 14 février)  early 2008. This note was based on the existing national 
regulations on mining, waste, industry and transportation, and closely considered the draft of the 
EU Directive on CCS was closely considered, even if it was not legally in place yet.
At the same time, the construction of the legal framework was informed by the available expertise 
on CCS, such as the one provided by the BRGM for example. France's comments on the EU CCS 
Directive draft,  accounted for the hearings of the managers of Total's project.  Thus, the project 
contributed to the formation of the legal and social regulation of CCS in Europe.
During the spring of 2008, Total continued the communication and dialog meetings with mayors 
and neighbors, including a workshop with the Jurançon municipal council in July 2008, and an open 
site visit complemented with an information letter to neighbors in December 2008. Total maintained 
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a dedicated telephone line for enquiries about the project, and published a quarterly newsletter.
Formal discussions on the project were conducted mostly at the CLIS ad-hoc commission. It was 
officially enacted on April 30th, 2008 by the Préfecture des Pyrénées Atlantiques. In the absence of 
CCS law, the CLIS was created using the legal model of commissions established to follow-up 
landfills and the Crétacé 4000 CLIS. It includes the various components of the social body: 1 State 
representatives; 9 locally elected officials; 2 delegates from workers' unions; 4 from associations; 5 
experts and 4 Total employees. The CLIS was established to discuss the authorization request and 
will sit at least for all the project's life. It met 8 times between June 2008 and December 2009.
The CLIS hears formal reports on the project from Total and experts like the BRGM. Its website 
(Commission  Locale  d’Information  et  de  Suivi  2010),  hosted  in  Préfecture's  official  website, 
provides access to the discussions reports and a significant range of supporting material. The CLIS 
visited  the  installations  twice.  At  the  first  visit,  it  discussed on site  with neighbors,  ultimately 
making a press release about the project, but did not conduct a formal public meeting at the storage 
site. The CLIS also asked for and heard a report on the history of accidents with natural gas in the 
area, reviewed the monitoring plan, security exercises, a local perception survey. It reviewed and 
improved the authorization document draft.
Associations  opposing the project,  CJE and SEPANSO Béarn (a federation affiliated to France 
Nature  Environment),  participated  actively  in  CLIS  meetings.  At  the  outset,  CJE  was  initially 
motivated  to  learn  and  understand.  Its  approximately  120  members  are  from  diverse  socio-
professionnal background, and includes both rural people established in Jurançon from a long time 
and newly arrived inhabitants. Moderate members are ready to discuss with Total. At the end of the 
summer 2008, the association was not ready to organize big demonstrations, but could mobilize 
reliably a more radical fraction in total opposition to the project, protesting for example in front of  
the injection site during the CLIS site.
• CJE's  scientific  advisor  summarized  the  objections  in  a  column published  in  a  leading 
national newspaper (Pépin 2009). Total was generally depicted as a big bad corporation that 
cannot be trusted to  develop CCS acceptably,  viewing its  concertation efforts  as mostly 
marketing and communication. The risk analysis was criticized for not considering massive 
release scenarios, and the security exercise for not directly involving neighbors.
• Opponents to the project questioned the independence of the BRGM, involved both in the 
project and in reviewing Total's permit request. CJE argued that the project could have been 
reviewed by an inter-disciplinary panel including foreign experts. BRGM replies with four 
arguments. First, BRGM is legitimate to examine the permit request because it is the public 
reference establishment for geosciences. Providing technical expertise to the administration 
is one of the core missions for which it has been created by the government. Second, the 
assessment was made only for the aspects in which the BRGM was competent, the expertise 
was conducted by a newly created unit of 13 specialists of security and impacts of CO2 
storage (Bureau de Recherches Géologiques et Minières 2009). Third, this unit's personnel 
was not implicated in site selection and characterisation studies, and BRGM's researches 
currently led in partnership with Total at  the Rousse site are disjunct from the injection 
permit request. Finally, it would have been difficult to find CCS experts, that were never 
involved in a joint research project with Total.
• Disagreements about the share of CCS in climate policies persisted. Opponents stated for 
example that IEA CCS scenarios are over-optimistic. SEPANSO raised these issues. They 
were not accepted as relevant by the CLIS, as they pertains to a national debate on policy 
choices between energy efficiency, renewables and cleaner fossil fuels.
• The opposition requested more technical reports release. Total argued commercial reasons to 
12
keep some documents non-public, but invited the experts to consult them on their premises. 
The CLIS president noted that the legal recourse against the permit may hinder transparency.
An  administrative  public  enquiry  was  held  from July  21  to  September  22,  2008  in  4  cities. 
Participation was very weak in Lacq, weak in towns along the pipeline, 90% of the comments were 
received in Jurançon. CJE criticized this administrative public enquiry on the grounds that it was 
conducted during the summer vacations, and the final advice was positive while 56 out of the 60 
recorded  comments  were  negative  (Préfecture  des  Pyrénées  Atlantiques  2008).  The  surveyors 
indeed assessed that the replies by the project-holder to the objections raised by the citizens were 
satisfying.  The  survey  is  not  a  vote,  and  60  self-selected  voices,  that  is  less  than  1% of  the 
population, are not representative.
A final  technical  problem had to  be examined before  injection:  signals  from the three  seismic 
sensors at the bottom of the well were lost, probably because a broken optical fiber. Total proposed 
to replace the sensors, but since that would take 9 months, to start the injection in the meantime. 
Without the sensors at the bottom of the well, the seismic monitoring network would comprise only 
the  7  sub-surface  sensors,  buried  200  meters.  The  permit  specified  that  it  was  the  operator's 
responsibility  to  determine  the  necessary  number  of  sensors.  Total's  case  that  the  incomplete 
network would be enough to monitor the site integrity was reviewed positively by two independant 
experts teams, so the Prefect did not cancel the autorization.
Municipal elections were held in March 2008.The project was not a stake of the campaign debates, 
as it was a politically risky topic with little to gain. The newly elected mayor in Jurançon initially 
took a  stance against  the project,  backed by an unanimous vote of the municipal  council.  The 
building permit for works needed at the injection site was not granted immediately, it had to be 
revised.
Besides Jurançon's Mayor and the Lacq's cities community (communauté de commune de Lacq),  
other  local  elected  leaders  were  mostly abstent  from the negociations.  Starting from that  tense 
relationship, after several discussion meetings and site visits the Jurançon's Mayor position evolved 
and  became  favorable  to  the  project.  The  move  dissatisfied  a  fraction  of  the  population.  A 
partnership  agreement  was  signed  in  April  2009.  The  agreement  was  described  by  Total  (De 
Marliave, personnal communication, 6/10/2010, our translation) as follows:
Total has signed multiple patronage and sponsorship agreements in the Aquitaine region  
for decades, and Total Exploration Production France (TEPF) has a 50 years history on  
these oil  production sites.  This  new storage project  was hence framed in the broader  
context seeing the end of TEPF activities in Lacq and the satellite fields by the end of  
2013, due to gas reserve depletion. This decline of an historical activity important for the  
region is subject to a policy of support and assistance in regional re-industrialisation. It is  
also notable that the CO2 injection required to stop the natural gas production from the  
well, which was modest but nevertheless represented a direct income for the town.
Within  this  overall  framework  and  without  any  mention  of  specific  Rousse  pilot,  a  
sponsorship agreement in the amount of € 1.5 million was signed with the municipality of  
Jurançon to assist in the implementation of community projects especially in the field of  
sustainable  energy  (solar  panels).  More  recently,  the  press  echoed  a  sponsorship  
agreement  of  TEPF for  the  Region  (an  amount  of  €5  million  was  mentionned).  This  
agreement is linked to the reduced activity of TEPF due to the end of the gas exploitation,  
and its connection with the storage project is all the more tenuous that the project has  
been underway since May 2009.
We found indeed that the sponsorship agreement was not all new money specific to the new storage 
project, but rather a consolidated reapraisal of already granted helps.
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The capture, transport and storage project was permitted on May 13, 2009, that is 27 months after 
the initial press conference. There are no injection taxes. On January 11, 2010, Valérie Letard, State 
secretary in charge of green technologies and climate negociations, with Christophe de Margerie, 
Total CEO, inaugurated the carbon capture and storage research pilot.
8. Operations (2010-2012)
The following summary of the project's operational phase is based on Monne (2012). At the Lacq 
plant,  an  existing   boiler  (constructed  in  1957)  was  revamped  for  oxycombustion,  adding 
recirculation. With four 8 MW burners, the 30 MWth oxyboiler produced 40 t/h of high pressure 
water vapor at 60 bars, 450°C. This boiler was  fed by an  Air Liquide's Air Separation Unit (ASU)  
which  produced  240 tO2/day.  The  flue  gas  was  then  processed  through  a  cooler,   a  wet  CO2 
compressor and a dehydration unit.
All those treatments allowed to produce a gas containing 92% CO2, 4% O2, 3,7% Ar and 0,3% N2 
which was then transported through an existing pipeline to the injection site in Rousse.
At the Lacq plant, the ASU worked to nominal specifications, the boiler worked well. The main 
technical  problem  encountered  was  corrosion  in  the  wet  stream  compressor  which  led  to  a 
significant  downtime  in  2010.  Temperature  and  pressure  conditions  at  the  third  stage  of  the 
compressor make water and NOx remaining in the stream to condense as corrosive nitric acid. After 
various modifications  (lowering of the cooling point, increasing drying) , the  system restarted in 
August 2010. During  the rest of 2010, it was cautiously operated below maximum capacity.  The 
problem could have been avoided by using a stainless steel compressor, or by using glycol washing 
rather  than  water  washing.  These  options  would  have  been  significantly  more  expensive,  and 
engineers did not expect the concentration of NOx at the boiler's exhaust to be as high as 500ppm.
At the Rousse platform, the gas was compressed to be injected in the reservoir at -4000m. The 
injection compressor  worked on design,  but  an operation error  during  a  restart  led to  particles 
entering the cylinder and required repairs.
One of the main concerns being the rupture of the well due to a seismic event, a comprehensive 
seismic monitoring system was operated:  three microseismic sensors at the bottom of the well and 
a network of seven 200 m wells with four microseismic captors each. The system was sensitive 
enough  to  localize  a  magnitude  -1  seismic  event  with  a  250m  error  margin.  Operation  rules 
prescribed to stop injection in case of an event of magnitude 3 or higher3.
The three microseismic sensors at the bottom of the well failed to function before the beginning of 
operations.Opponents argued that this was a cause to cancel the project's authorization. In reply, 
Total demonstrated that the surface microseismic network provided good enough monitoring, to the 
satisfaction of the administration. After one year  of operations, the failed bottomhole sensors were 
replaced  during  a  well  workover.  Inspection  of  the  tubing  during  this  workover  showed  no 
corrosion in the tubing.
Seismic monitoring in operation recorded three events with magnitude between -1 and -0,3. The 
bottomhole sensors recorded numerous seismic events with a magnitude between -3 to -1,5 which is 
too low to impact reservoir's integrity and hard to localize. Their interpretation and attribution to 
natural or man-made causes is ambiguous because there was no baseline with bottomhole sensors. 
The seismic baseline was acquired with the surface network only, and showed the activity of the 
3 The energy contained in earthquakes is qualified using the Richert magnitude scale. A magnitude -1 event releases 
about 2 kJ. This is the muzzle energy of a standard NATO rifle round. The scale is base 10 logarithmic. A magnitude 
1 event releases a thousand times more energy than a magnitude -1 event, and a magnitude 3 event a million times 
more than a magnitude -1 event. Events with magnitude lower than 2.0 are called microearthquakes and normally 
cause no damage to life or property, and are very rarely felt by people.
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nearby Pyrénées mountain range.
The pressure in the reservoir increased with injection and is forecast to reach around 100 bars at the 
end of 2013. This is consistent with the higher of the two model simulations performed before 
observations. There is no evidence of either increase or decrease of the injectivity index. This is also 
in line with theoretical studies. It is forecasted that in two or three centuries, most carbon dioxyde 
will slowly fall towards the bottom of the reservoir, leaving the well area methane-rich.
Monne (2012) argued that the majority of theses issues are normal operational risks for this kind of 
engineering projects, not specific to the CCS innovation. He also reported that because this was an 
innovative project, the company was expected to reply to the media urgently when anything out of 
order happened.
A comprehensive ecological monitoring plan was conducted.  Concentration,  fluxes and isotopic 
composition of CH4 and CO2 in the ground were measured in 35 places, twice a year in autumn and 
winter. Water was analyzed in four springs every six months, five rivers and aquifers. Annual flora 
and fauna inventories revealed no change since 2009.
To sum up, until October 2012 the project injected 47 000 t of CO2, demonstrating the technical and 
social feasibility. The closing and post-closure phases will also be innovations, from technical and 
administrative point of views.
9. The broader social impact, evidence from the press
To assess  the  project's  social  impact  beyond the Lacq - Jurançon axis,  we researched the  main 
newspapers in France, looking in their online archives for mentions about CCS, over 2005-2012.
At the national scale, we looked at three influential general news titles Le Monde, Liberation and Le 
Figaro, and the two influential business news titles La Tribune and Les Echos. We observed that the 
Lacq project was mentionned only sporadically, always in the context of the more general question 
of CCS. More precisely, since 2007 on average CCS is mentioned about once per month in these 
journals (about 15 times per 3 months, for 5 journals), with the exception of the last quarter of 2009 
when the Copenhaguen conference was discussed. We conclude that this local project never became 
an object of debate at the national level.
In the region of Aquitaine, the dominant newspaper is  Sud Ouest. This daily journal, founded in 
1944, is France's third largest regional newspaper with about a million paper and online readers 
according to themselves (Sud Ouest,  2013, based on an Audipresse One 2011 study).  Over the 
2005-2012 period we found 126 articles mentioning the project. The median text length was 281 
words,  average  322,  minimum 41,  maximum 1 410.  The  sample  includes  about  15  duplicates 
(generally not published on the same day), since the journal shares editorial content in its 21 local 
paper editions and its website. Illustration 4 shows the time distribution of these articles.
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Illustration 4: Mentions of Total's pilot CCS project in the journal Sud Ouest.
We analyzed the content by encoding it along two dimensions. First, was it published (i) only in the 
local editions for Lacq, Rousse and Pau ; (ii) in another local edition ; or was it published (iii) on 
the web or in newspaper pages common to all editions ? Second what was the angle of the paper ? 
We distinguished four possible angles: (i) Framing about the project, (ii) Framing about the public 
stances, demonstration, or opposition. (iii) Framing about the debate issues and procedures, (iv) 
Implementation and decision. These four angles correspond to stages of a social political decision 
process.  These  stages  are  not  irreversible  steps  in  a  waterfall  decision-making  procedure: 
deliberative processes can iterate back and forth as needed.
Illustration 5 shows the distribution of articles over time along these two dimensions. The project 
had four defining events. These correspond to the local maximum in Illustration 4, the times where 
the project was discussed relatively more in the press, and from an higher angle. They are:
• The concertation organized by Total in the final quarter of 2007.
• The positive vote of the local city's  association of Lacq (communauté de communes de 
Lacq) on July 3rd, 2008. A few days later, the city of Jurançon voted a motion of distrust 
(despite being represented at the local city's association of Lacq).
• Inauguration in January 2010. Surprisingly the inauguration was treated as a news of local 
interest, as opposed to the July 2008 vote which had been reported in the general editions of 
the regional press.
• Debates in 2011 about wether the injection permit, initially given for two years, should be 
extended.  The  administration's  positive  answer  on  November  14,  2011  remained  a  low 
importance news item. The extension permitted injection up to July 8, 2013. It restricted the 
total quantity of CO2 injected to 90 000 t instead of the 120 000 t previously granted. This 
was in agreement with norms defined by the newly published European directive on CCS 
research projects and did not threaten the project's technical or scientific value.
Overall, we conclude that in the regional press the project existed as a news topic between 2007 and 
2011. A public debate existed before and after the public consultation period. But while the debate 
about the after-Total and the industrial future of the area remain active, the debate about the local 
consequences of the CCS project was sidelined during 2012.
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Illustration 5: Angle of the papers about Total's CCS project in Sud Ouest
10. Discussion, lessons learned and conclusions
In  this  case,  Total  demonstrated  a  strong  will  to  engage  a  concertation,  allocating  significant 
resources early on:  hiring a consulting firm and allocating senior  engineers time to answer the 
questions. The concertation covered the whole territory from Lacq, where acceptability was likely 
from the  start,  to  Jurançon where  things  were  more  delicate.  The  social  conditions  were  very 
favorable to the project. For two generations, the operator has been the first economic and therefore 
political power in the area, and has consistently demonstrated that it could control higher risks. The 
project answered local needs for economic development directly and indirectly,  in the long run 
context of the gas field depletion. Research on CCS is supported nationally and internationally by 
scientists and States. All these reasons contribute to explain why the permit was obtained.
Still there are lessons to be learned. Total's position would have been stronger if its permit request  
had  been expertised by a  different  team,  and if  it  had more  specific  long-term plans.  Because 
concertation  meetings  were  held  before  elections,  the  local  officials  could  only  take  a  non-
commited  stance.  Using  a  parisian  consulting  firm to  moderate  the  discussion,  and employing 
hostesses to hand out the information packages was not appreciated by the people of Jurançon. 
Total, following the advice of the president of the national commission on public debates, did not 
mass-mail  the  community with  information  on the  project.  Consequently,  citizens  came to  the 
meetings to receive information, not to defend a stance in a debate. Another reason why the public 
participation in the discussion was low is that smaller formats might have been more interactive.
This  case  exposes  the  difficulty  of  modern  governance.  A  balance  between  concertation, 
information and representativity has to  be found for  each issue,  depending on local  ethics and 
customs as well science and technology. As concluded by Ha-Duong and Chaabane eds. (2010) this 
balance can only be found pragmatically. Technology policy is progressive and interactive, it needs 
projects to go forward. The project contributed to the regulation framework itself. The CLIS worked 
well, but the formal public survey came late in the procedure and did not interest much the citizens. 
Risk  management  studies  were  revised,  and  landscape  integration  in  the  environment  was 
improved. Landscaping is the sensory interface with the community.
The process of consultation which aims to be a process of open dialogue was strengthened and 
legitimized by the foundation of the residents' association CJE. The radicalization of CJE's position 
during the concertation process impacted the balance of the public discussions with the project 
holders at CLIS. Total had to adjust its position, and could not do without an understanding of the 
values expressed by the public at meetings of the association.
It might have been presumed that since geological storage is a highly technical subject, there was 
some rationality in technocratic decision making, where executive powers are delegated to elected 
representatives and State's engineers. Most citizens know little to no geoscience, and might err on 
the side of too much precaution when asked about an R&D project, since research means that there 
is a knowledge gap somewhere. In this case, the argument needs discussion, since some neighbors 
were perfectly knowledgeable about the Rousse reservoir, having worked at Total. We observed that 
the citizens tied with Total, retired or still active, exercised self-restraint in the public debates.
The  case  also  highlights  the  issue  of  independance.  As  for  many  new  technologies  or  drug 
assessments, CCS experts generally have an interest in the development of CCS. And local people 
in the administration, the industry and even the environmental associations mostly belong to the 
same social network. We believe that far from being a problem, strong communication links on the 
human side is an asset for governance.  Beyond sharing knowledge, a key to the successful co-
construction of a social innovation is the widening and deepening of the social network behind it. In 
this case, giving information empowered the local community to act. Having concerned citizens ask 
pointed questions to the experts balances power. The fact that the concertation led the neighbors to 
create an association of opponents probably improved the quality of the CLIS debates.
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Illustration 6: Map of the CO2 pipeline from capture at the Lacq natural gas processing plant 
(north-west) to the Rousse 3 injection site in Jurançon (south-east). The 29 km gas pipeline starts in  
Lacq (legal population 716, according to ). It then crosses the cities of Abidos (pop. 237); Aubertin 
(649); Artiguelouve (1 505); Lagor (1 241), Os-Marsillon (494); Mourenx (7 734); Mont (977); 
Noguères (154); Parbayse (249); Pardies (959); Laroin (946); Saint Faust (781) and arrives in 
Jurançon (population 7 241, density about 370 people/km²). Pau, the big city just north of 
Jurançon, has 86 772 inhabitants. Source: CIRED, cartographic data (c) OSM. Inset map (c) 
Wikimedia commons.
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